



COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATION REPORT

Thycotic Secret Server Government Edition v10.0

23 October 2018

383-4-445

v1.1





FOREWORD

This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded through departmental communications security channels to your Client Services Representative at CSE.

The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility – established under the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme – using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian CC Scheme, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT product by the Communications Security Establishment, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.

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OVERVIEW

The Canadian Common Criteria Scheme provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCEF) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Communications Security Establishment.

A CCEF is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025:2005, the General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.

By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCEF.

The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Certified Products list (CPL) for the Canadian CC Scheme and to the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Project).



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Thycotic Secret Server Government Edition v10.0 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Thycotic, was the subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this evaluation demonstrate that TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Table 1 for the evaluated security functionality.

Cygnacom Solutions is the CCEF that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed 23 October 2018 and was carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme.

The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.

Communications Security Establishment, as the Certification Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all the conditions of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the Canadian Certified Products list (CPL) and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the International Common Criteria Project).

1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:

Table 1 TOE Identification

TOE Name and Version	Thycotic Secret Server Government Edition v10.0
Developer	Thycotic
Conformance Claim	Protection Profile for Enterprise Security Management - Identity and Credential Management, version 2.1, 24 October 2013

1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE

The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4.

1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION

The TOE is an enterprise identity and credential management application. The TOE is used as an enterprise credential manager, where the association of attributes of an individual user with specific credentials can be understood as identity management and the ability to change and revoke credentials as a credential management.

The TOE is used in enterprise settings to define and maintain user credentials within a large organization. The TOE is responsible for associating users with different sets of privileges with the access to the operational environment resources and services.

1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE

A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:




Figure 1 TOE Architecture



2 SECURITY POLICY

The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:

- Enterprise Security Management
- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access
- Trusted Path/Channels

Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in section 8.2.

2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY

The following Government of Canada approved cryptographic algorithms were evaluated by the CAVP and used by the TOE:

Table 2 Cryptographic Algorithm(s)

Cryptographic Algorithm	Standard	Certificate Number
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)	FIPS 197	#2832
Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA)	FIPS 186-4	#1487
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHS)	FIPS 180-3	#2373
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)	FIPS 198	#1773
Deterministic Random Bit Generation (DRBG)	SP 800-90A	#489
Component Validation List	SP 800-135	#323



3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS OF SCOPE

Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the product's installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.

3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:

- The TOE will use cryptographic primitives provided by the Operational Environment to perform cryptographic services;
- There will be a defined enrollment process that confirms user identity before the assignment of credentials;
- The TOE will be able to establish connectivity to other ESM products in order to share security data;
- Third-party entities that exchange attribute data with the TOE are assumed to be trusted;
- There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to install, configure, and operate the TOE; and
- The TOE will receive reliable time data from the Operational Environment.

3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE

The TOE incorporates CAVP validated cryptography and was not subjected to a CMVP validation.

With regards to TLS, the TOE does not log failure to establish a session and relies on the underlying platform (Windows). Windows does not however capture the IP address or forward the requests when it detects a TLS error. This issue was raised with the ESM Technical Rapid Response Team and determined to be acceptable.

The TOE supports a number of features that are not part of the core functionality. Those features are excluded from scope of the evaluation:

- Use of the SMTP is not evaluated
- Use of SAML is not evaluated
- Integration with HSM is not evaluated
- Use of automatic account discovery is not evaluated
- Use of remote password changing functionality is not evaluated, except for Unix Account SSH Secrets
- Use of session launcher is not evaluated, except for Putty Launcher used with Unix Account SSH Secrets
- Use of automatic patching is not evaluated
- Use of remote database server is not evaluated, in the evaluated configuration database installed locally
- High availability deployments and backup functionality are not evaluated



4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION

The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:

- The TOE (Thycotic Secret Server Government Edition v10.0, build 104.000003) installed on a platform running
 - Microsoft Windows Server 2012 R2 (x64)
 - Microsoft .NET Framework 4.5.1
 - Microsoft SQL Server 2016

With support from the Operating environment for:

- Syslog Server
- Active Directory Server
- CRL Server

4.1 DOCUMENTATION

The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:

- a. Secret Server User Guide, document version 1.1, July 2018
- b. Secret Server Getting Started Guide, document version 1.1, July 2018
- c. Thycotic Secret Server Functional Specification, document version 0.3, 14 March 2018
- d. Common Criteria Hardening Guide, Secret Server v10.0, document version 1.011, August 2018



5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES

The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.

5.1 DEVELOPMENT

The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional requirements (SFRs). The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.

5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance, and determined that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.

Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.

5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT

An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.

The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.



6 TESTING ACTIVITIES

Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent functional tests, and performing penetration tests.

6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS

The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and reviewing their test results, as documented in the ETR. The correspondence between the tests identified in the developer's test documentation and the functional specification was complete.

6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING

The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are documented in a separate Test Results document.

6.3 INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONAL TESTING

During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional tests by examining design and guidance documentation.

All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The following testing activity was performed:

- a. PP Assurance Activities: The evaluator performed the assurance activities listed in the claimed PP.

6.3.1 FUNCTIONAL TEST RESULTS

The developer's tests and the independent functional tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its ST and functional specification.



6.4 INDEPENDENT PENETRATION TESTING

Subsequent to the independent review of public domain vulnerability databases and all evaluation deliverables, limited independent evaluator penetration testing was conducted. The penetration tests focused on:

- a. Use of automated vulnerability scanning tools to discover potential network, platform and application layer vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed, Shellshock, FREAK, POODLE, and GHOST; and
- b. Login field overflow: This test case explored how the TOE handles long usernames and passwords; and
- c. Session cookie hijacking: This test case attempts to takeover an admin session through the use of session cookies.

6.4.1 PENETRATION TEST RESULTS

The independent penetration testing did not uncover any exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating environment.



7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Table 1. The overall verdict for this evaluation is **PASS**. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.

The IT product identified in this report has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility established under the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4. These evaluation results apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete certification report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common Criteria Scheme and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSE or by any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, is expressed or implied.

7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS

It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.



8 SUPPORTING CONTENT

8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Term	Definition
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCEF	Common Criteria Evaluation Facility
CM	Configuration Management
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
GC	Government of Canada
IT	Information Technology
ITS	Information Technology Security
PP	Protection Profile
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Function



8.2 REFERENCES

Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
Security target for Thycotic Secret Server Government Edition v10.0, v1.5, 22 October 2018.
Evaluation technical report for Thycotic Secret Server Government Edition v10.0, v1.2, 23 October 2018.
Assurance activity report for Thycotic Secret Server Government Edition v10.0, v1.7, 23 October 2018.